In this paper we define and give a solution to the problem of identification of passwords on media.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords continue to be the primary means of authenticating users in the Internet. Because of the proliferation of useful websites and access to accounts relating to finance, commerce and entertainment, the typical user today has to have many accounts and many passwords. In addition, supposedly for security reasons, many sites have adopted password policies that force users to include length, symbol and digit requirements. Thus users are increasingly turning to saving their passwords in some manner, either on paper or on their computers. When storing passwords on disk, users typically use either password management software, use the browser's password recall option or preferentially save the passwords directly on disk (or on a cell phone). In a survey in 2012 by Kaspersky Lab [1] 29% do not simply remember passwords but rather store them on media. 13% create a text document on the hard drive, 9%
write them on a cell phone, and only 7% use specialized software. As passwords are increasingly being required to be complex, we believe users will turn more and more to storing them on disk. In our own recent informal survey of 100 students, we found that 42% store their passwords and 55% of these do so on disk or cell phone in clear text without encryption or using specialized software.
There have been a few studies on how to find passwords used for encryption or passwords stored through browsers [2, 3, 4] . However, we are unaware of any work that tries to distinguish passwords from other strings that are stored directly by the user on disk. We thus propose the problem of identifying passwords on media.
Suppose that law enforcement captures a hard disk and needs to find if there are any stored passwords on that disk. An example scenario [18] is when there are encrypted files on disk (say illegal photos) and there is some likelihood that the user has stored the passwords somewhere on the disk to easily access these encrypted files. An investigator could look at each file and try to determine by context and structure which strings might be passwords. This would of course be quite tedious, especially with very large disks.
Investigators sometimes use existing tools to tokenize all the strings on the disk and use these as a dictionary for offline cracking of the encrypted files. They find however that the list often becomes too large to build a dictionary that can be subsequently used for cracking. The identification problem is to distinguish the tokens that are more likely to be passwords and winnow down the list to a more manageable one. This problem is non-trivial because distinguishing which of the strings are passwords from a large set of strings has no obvious solution.
In our work, we first analyze a disk image and attempt to retrieve all strings on the disk that could possibly be passwords, which we call tokens. During this process of retrieval and subsequent processing, which we call filtering, we prune a potentially very large set of tokens to a more manageable smaller set that we expect contains most of the passwords. We do this through implementing a set of relevant filters applied to the tokens. These filters are specifically designed for the identification of passwords on media problem. We next use a previously trained probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) [5, 6] to decide which of the remaining tokens are likely to be passwords by assigning each token a probability. In the final phase we use these probabilities and develop a set of ranking algorithms to suggest an ordered list of tokens that we believe would be the stored passwords. This list can be then used as a dictionary by the investigator to do password cracking using any appropriate approach.
Our work is unique in not only defining the problem of identifying passwords on disk but also in its use of the PCFG approach and the development of the filters and ranking algorithms. Our results show that on average we can identify 60% of the passwords within the top 2000 potential passwords returned to the investigator. Note that our approach for identifying passwords can also be adapted for use with cell phones and USB flash drives. This paper is organized as follows: We discuss related work in section 2 and then turn to the design of our system for identifying passwords on disk. In section 3 we discuss examining the disk, retrieving a set of tokens and applying filters to create a reasonably pruned set of potential passwords. In section 4 we discuss how to assign probabilities to the tokens and develop several ranking algorithms to identify the passwords. In section 5 we describe our experimental results and in section 6 we present some concluding remarks and future work.
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
We consider three types of related work in this section. First we examine work directly related to our identification problem on media. In general there is none or very little documented work related to this problem. Garfinkel et al. [7] discuss a more general problem of trying to capture a storage profile for each computer to detect anomalous behavior. They propose to monitor the forensic content of the disk (or other media) such as email addresses, credit card numbers etc. Our work in fact could be used in their project for capturing potential password strings.
With respect to identifying passwords, some papers mention that tools exist for finding desired strings on disk (which means you must know the password that you are looking for) while other papers indicate that recovery tools such as EnCase [8] and FTK [9] have the capability of finding passwords on disks by which they mean that these systems can give a list of all strings on the disk. As we shall see, the real problems is filtering these strings and determining the likeliest strings which might be passwords.
There does exist one tool that we know about that searches for sensitive data on the disk. Identity Finder [10] is a commercial "sensitive data manager" toolkit. It searches for sensitive data (e.g. passwords, credit card numbers, social security numbers, etc.) in a variety of places including files, emails, browsers, registry files, databases, and websites. As for searching for data on hard disk, Identity Finder checks only the files which have metadata information available to the file system. As of our knowledge, it does not look at unallocated space for searching password in deleted files. Furthermore, Identity Finder provides password search customization by enabling certain keyword and regular expression search thus requiring the investigator to propose a string search similar to what is done by EnCase and FTK. Again, this tool does not tackle the password identification problem.
A related aspect that has been explored a bit more is to find a password that has been used to encrypt a file or to find the user's login password. For example Hargreaves et al. [2] explore the recovery of encryption keys from memory. If the memory is preserved when encrypted files are open it is possible to find them. Similarly, Lee et al. [3] explore the same problem for login by collecting and examining page files. This work is quite interesting but is orthogonal to our research.
A third aspect that has been explored is to try to find passwords that have been stored by browsers. For example, Chrome Password Recovery [4] is an open source command line password recovery tool which retrieves and prints all saved login information (username, password, and website link) from Google Chrome. It only focuses on recovering sensitive data from an encrypted Google Chrome password database file such as encryption / decryption keys; it is not a tool to perform identification of saved passwords on a hard disk.
We next briefly discuss some background in the use of probabilistic context free grammars. This approach has been applied to password cracking and to building better passwords. Our work uses these grammars for ranking the tokens we find with respect to their likelihood of being user passwords.
Probabilistic Context Free Grammars
We used the probabilistic password cracking approach [5, 6] in order to assign probability values to potential password tokens. In this approach a password's base structure is defined based on the component type (L for alpha string, D for digit string and S for special symbol string) and the length of the string is incorporated into the base structure. Thus for example the password string alice123#% has base structure L5D3S2. A probabilistic grammar is determined from a training corpus by calculating the frequencies of all the base structures found and all the component structures (of each length) found in the corpus. The resulting information is structured as a context free grammar. For example, alice123#% can be derived as follows: S  L5D3S2 aliceD3S2alice123S2alice123#%
At each step there is a probability assigned to the rule transition. The product of the transition probabilities is the probability of the resulting string. As shown in [6] we can use this approach to define the probability of any token given a context-free grammar derived from a realistic corpus of passwords.
EXAMINING THE DISK
Our goal is to identify passwords stored in files directly on disk by the user where the user is not actively trying to hide them. We assume that a user is simply storing the passwords in a file on disk that may or may not contain other text in order to remember their password if needed. The file can be in allocated space or unallocated space (file might be deleted) or hidden through the operating system.
A more sophisticated user might use specialized software to hide passwords in unallocated space in a partition, in file slack space or in other non-file system space. Although in this paper we do not focus on this scenario, we expect that we could still find such data on the disk as long as encryption or steganography is not used. For example, if the user explicitly hides data or file to slack space of a file or partition, we could use slack space tool bmap or file carver scalpel respectively in order to retrieve data or file from slack space. After the recovery of data we can write the data to a text file for the tokenization process explained in section 3.2. We might fail in certain circumstances such as when passwords are hidden in an arbitrary space on the disk. Although we could see the plain string stream via a HEX editor and possibly echo the data to a text file, it can be difficult to determine string boundaries when any garbage data is intentionally or unintentionally added to the string stream. So the password identification problem could become harder under these circumstances.
We next discuss our process of finding files on the disk, retrieving the strings from these files that could be potential passwords and doing a filtering process to reduce the tokens to a more manageable set.
Recovering Files from the Disk
We first need to retrieve all the different types of files from the file system of a given disk image. For this purpose, we used tsk_recover which is part of The Sleuth Kit [11] , an open source digital forensics tool that consists of a set of command line tools for analyzing disk images. Note that tsk_recover is able to recover files from both allocated and unallocated spaces. In this work, we specifically focus on file systems that are uncorrupted. Files for which the metadata information is lost or damaged are not considered. Data carving tools could be used to retrieve files that might reside in other part of the disk such as slack space, lost partitions, unallocated space in partitions, etc. Using these tools we could create one or more files that could then be analyzed in the same way as the uncorrupted files.
Retrieving Tokens from the Files
After recovering files from the disk, we next need to extract those strings that could potentially be passwords. We extract white space separated strings from file types such as .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .rtf, .odt, .pdf, and .txt.
Since some of the file types are not readable by text editors, our system converts these files to text file format in order to be able to read the contents of the files. To convert files with extensions doc, docx, xls, xlsx, rtf, odt, pdf, we use respectively the open source tools: catdoc, docx2txt, xls2txt, unoconv and xls2txt, unrtf, odt2txt, and pdftotext.
Our system uses space, tab and newline as delimiters to tokenize the string streams for each file. It then creates an associated text file to the original where each token is written on a single line. These associated files will be used to search for potential passwords.
The accuracy of the tokens retrieved from the files is completely based on the conversion performance of the tools that we used. There are two possible problems. First, there might be some strings that are altered during the conversion process. Second, there also might be some strings which are not in the original file but created by those tools. This latter case only happened when converting .xls and .xlsx files containing multiple sheets for which the tool would add each sheet name. In our experiments with the tools we rarely found a problem in the conversion process. We are able to get only and all the strings in the files including from tables in .doc and .docx and everything in the cells of the .xls and .xlsx files. The only thing we currently do not get is text in images in these files. Images sometimes create strings in the conversion process that we are able to completely filter out later.
Initial Filtering
Even an average sized disk typically contains many different file types and files with text content resulting in a huge number of tokens. In order to be able to reduce the set of tokens that we retrieve, we define a set of rules that filters out some classes of tokens that we believe are very unlikely to be passwords.
We examined some revealed password sets (results of attacks on various websites such as Rockyou [15] and Yahoo [17] ) to get insight into what kinds of structures are rarely seen in passwords. The set of initial filters that we define and apply is as follows:
• Non printing: These are ASCII characters that are almost always not valid password characters.
• Length: Passwords usually have certain lengths based on the policies enforced on each website.
Here we apply a conservative bound and only consider the tokens with length l, 6 < l < 21. For example the Yahoo set had only 1.93% of passwords of length less than 7 and 0.047% greater than 20.
• Floating point: The files on disk (especially the .xls files) can often include a lot of floating point numbers. It seemed a good idea to filter out any floating point numbers since our studies on revealed password sets show that there is very little chance of such tokens being real passwords. We therefore • Repeated tokens: In each file, we only keep one copy of tokens that are repeated multiple times.
One might think that repeated tokens are not likely to be passwords, but it is possible that users store password information for many different accounts and thus would have multiple copies in a file.
• Word punctuations: We remove tokens that seem to include punctuation patterns of a sentence by filtering out tokens that contain only alpha strings ending with any of the following characters:
;:,.?!-)}. We also filter out such tokens starting with ( or {. Our examination showed that only 0.516% of such tokens are found in a sample of 1 million passwords in the Rockyou set.
Specialized Alpha String Filtering
It is obvious that a very large part of every text file contains English words. Thus, an extremely prevalent class of tokens found on a hard disk is the set of alpha strings (those containing only alphabetic characters). In this paper we consider various approaches to handling such strings. We define the specialized alpha string filters as follows and analyze their effectiveness in section 5.4.
• All-alphas: This filter eliminates tokens that are all alpha strings. In this case we assume that most of the time passwords do not contain only alphabet characters but also contain digits or special symbols as well. This is further enforced by current password creation policies.
• Sentences: This filter tries to eliminate all alpha strings within sentences only. To detect sentences after the file type conversion we use OpenNLP [12] . This tool can detect whether a punctuation character marks the end of a sentence or not. It cannot however identify sentence boundaries based on the contents of the sentence. It only returns a set of indices for which each sentence (or a non-sentence) will be on a separate line. An additional problem we faced is that during the conversion process to a .txt file, word wrapping is not preserved as line breaks are added, so sentences which continue into another line, are considered separate indices by OpenNLP. We use heuristics in order to try to detect which indices are sentences and which are not. We verify if an index starts with a capital letter and ends with a period [13] . Such sentences are then filtered out.
• Capitalization: This filter eliminates all lower case alpha strings. This is because some of the password policies allow you to have passwords, which contain one or more of the classes (symbols, digits, and capital letters).
• Dictionary words: This filter eliminates alpha strings that appear in a dictionary. The purpose of using an English dictionary is to try to eliminate words that are most likely words of text in sentences in the documents, and keep the rest of the strings in our token set.
• Multiwords: This filter eliminates all alpha strings that are not multiwords. A multiword is defined to be a string consisting of two or more words. Words are defined by a dictionary. Such strings would include passphrases that are alpha strings and appear to be increasingly used as passwords.
IDENTIFYING PASSWORDS
In this section we address the main question of how to distinguish and find a password among a set of tokens. Once we have examined the hard disk and retrieved all the tokens separated by whitespace we need a mechanism to distinguish a password from other sequences of characters that appear in a text file.
Calculating Probabilities of the Tokens
As discussed previously in background work, a probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) can be created from training on a large set of real user passwords. This PCFG models a password distribution and the way users create the passwords. By knowing the structure of passwords we can then differentiate passwords from regular text. Given a PCFG we can calculate the probability of a given string in the password distribution. In order to calculate the probability of a given string we use the method described in [6] . We parse the given string into its components and find the probabilities associated with each component from the PCFG. As an example, consider the string "violin22" which can be represented as base structure L6D2. The product of probabilities of each component (base structure L6D2, alpha string violin, all lower case capitalization M6, and digit component 22) is the estimated probability value of the string. Using this approach we can calculate the probabilities of all of the retrieved tokens. For the rest of this section the (retrieved) tokens will mean those remaining after the initial filtering.
Ranking Algorithms
After calculating the probability value of each token, our goal is now to rank these tokens and output a limited set of token (say the top N tokens which we call the potential password set) for the investigator to examine as the most likely possible passwords from the hard disk. Obviously, the ideal is having both high precision and high recall in this potential password set. Recall can be more important in an offline attack while precision might be more important in an online attack. One might argue that in the case of an offline attack one could try all the tokens on the disk. We believe that it is very important to reduce the size of the potential password set; although computers have become much more powerful through the use of GPUs etc., many hashing algorithms (for example TrueCrypt) can still purposely take a very long time for the resources available to typical law enforcement.
In order to obtain the best precision and recall we tried different approaches to create the top potential passwords from the retrieved tokens. In this section we discuss our three different approaches for ranking the possible passwords. Note that we maintain the strings and the file they are associated with and we use this relationship in our algorithms. In our algorithms we use a parameter N which is the number of potential passwords that we return to the investigator. The three different approaches that we evaluated are:
Top Overall: In this natural approach we select the N highest probability tokens from all of the retrieved tokens. However, our results in section 5.3 show that this is not the most effective approach.
Top Percent (per File):
In this approach, we select an equal percentage of the highest probability tokens from each file such that the total number of tokens returned is N. The resulting tokens are then ordered by their probabilities.
Top 1-by-1 (per File):
In the first round, we choose the highest probability token from each file and then rank them by highest probability. In the second round we select the second highest probability token from each file (if available) and again rank them by highest probability. Similarly for the next rounds until we reach N tokens. Note that round j tokens are ranked above round j + 1.
In section 5.3 we compare these three algorithms in some detail.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section we discuss our test results both on the utility of our filtering techniques as well as the effectiveness of our algorithms to identify passwords. Since we did not have access to test disks that contain known real passwords, we used available test files to create our own disk images containing a number of real user passwords taken from revealed sets of passwords.
Experimental Setup
We used the Digital Corpora Govdocs1 [14] as the source of our files. This corpora contains about one million freely redistributable files in many different file formats. For our testing purpose we created five data disk images of different sizes each with a FAT file system. See Table 1 . Each of the data disk images is a model of a real disk and is a subset of a typical complete disk. A fairly large amount of space of a real disk is devoted to the operating system, media files (video, music, image), and installed programs. For our disks we only used files likely to be created by the user as discussed in section 3.2 (.doc, .xls, .pdf, etc.).
The sizes of the data disk images in Table 1 are only the total data sizes of these files. For example the 1 GB data disk might likely be derived from a 500 GB hard disk of a typical user. In our experiments we randomly selected passwords from a revealed password set and then randomly selected a file to which to add each password. Since we do not have any data on how users store their passwords, either in one file or many files or at the end of large files, etc., we tried to be as general as possible in adding the passwords. The revealed sets that we used are the results of attacks on various websites and typically used in password studies. We used a set of one million passwords from Rockyou [15] , 300 thousand from CSDN [16] and 300 thousand from Yahoo [17].
Experiments Related to Initial Filtering
In this section we show how the filters help in reducing the number of tokens. We used our initial filtering techniques as described previously, and calculated the number of tokens before and after applying each of the initial filters for each disk size (50 MB, 100 MB, 250 MB, 500 MB and 1 GB). We also used the most aggressive specialized filtering of removing all alpha strings. The results are shown in Table 2 . As seen in the table, all of the filters except Non-printing have a major impact on the end result,
reducing the large number of tokens we obtain from the hard disk to a smaller and a more manageable set.
The Non-printing filter is important in our next step of calculating the probabilities but was rarely actually useful for reduction. When applying the filters, the order does not really matter (except for time) since the same result obtains no matter which ordering is used. Table 3 shows the number of tokens (in millions) before and after filtering and the percentage of reduction when applying all of the above filters together.
Experiments for Ranking Algorithms
In this section we explore results relating to the three algorithms previously discussed. We tested on different sized disks as discussed in section 5.1. We used two revealed sets, Rockyou and CSDN, from which we chose passwords to store on the disks. We used the initial filters and the all-alphas filter.
Some of the websites such as Rockyou did not have any password policy enforced at the time of the attack and similarly with the other sets. Because of this a good number of passwords in these lists have length less than 7 or are alpha strings. In this series of tests because we are only comparing the ranking algorithms, we chose to not store such passwords on the disks. We stored 5 passwords on each disk in one series of test and 15 passwords in a second series of tests. We believe this represents a range of passwords that a normal user might have stored. We stored the passwords either in a file or in a deleted file. We used the Yahoo set for training our PCFG that is used to calculate the probabilities of the potential passwords.
For each combination of disk size, revealed set and number of passwords stored, we determined how many passwords we are able to find using our three different algorithms (top overall, top percent, and top 1-by-1). We determined the results when returning N potential passwords to the investigator, where N is 1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, and 16000. In the tables we show the number of passwords found in the disk by our algorithms (true positives).
In Table 4 we show the results for storing 5 passwords from CSDN. For example, using the 1-by-1 algorithm, we can find all 5 passwords on the 50 MB data disk, 3 passwords on the 100 MB data disk, 2 passwords on the 250 MB data disk, etc., within the top N = 1000 returned by the algorithm. When comparing algorithms given an N and the number of stored passwords, a higher recall implies a higher precision and they can be both calculated from the number of passwords found. For example, the average recall value of the 1-by-1 algorithm across different disk sizes for N = 8000 is 92%, for the top percent algorithm is 56% and for the top overall algorithm is 40%. This shows that the 1-by-1 algorithm has both higher precision and higher recall compared to the other algorithms.
In Table 5 , we show the results for storing 15 passwords from CSDN. For N = 8000 the average recall value of the 1-by-1 algorithm is 89.3% across the different disk sizes. Tables 4 and 5 show that the 1-by-1 algorithm is quite good and better than the others. Tables 6 and 7 show similar results for storing passwords from the Rockyou password set. In Table 6 , the average recall value of the 1-by-1 algorithm for N = 8000 is 84%, for the top percent algorithm is 72%
and for the top overall algorithm is 60%. In Table 7 as an example of a smaller N (N = 1000), the average recall value for the 1-by-1 algorithm is 81.3% and the average precision is 1.2%. We also captured the amount of time that our algorithms took on each of the test runs. The total time taken for retrieving the tokens, filtering, ranking and returning the top potential passwords for the largest data disk in our experiments was less than 3 minutes and it was 13 seconds for the smallest.
Overall, it appears that the 1-by-1 algorithm is consistently the best. Recall that in our experiments so far, the filters eliminated all alpha strings. We believe that this is reasonable to do as today's password policies would almost invariably disallow such passwords. However, we next explore whether less restrictive filtering of alpha strings can be useful.
Experiments with Specialized Filters
In this section we do tests comparing the specialized filters (defined in section 3.4) in order to keep some subset of the alpha strings. These filters are applied in addition to the initial filters. We use the 1 GB disk and store 15 passwords from the Rockyou set. In these tests we allow alpha string passwords to be selected from the set for storage. Note that this may result in filtering these passwords before the identification process. (11) shows that four of the passwords stored on the disk were filtered out due to the filtering process.
The multiwords filter eliminates all single words (whether it is a dictionary word or not). The dictionary filter however eliminates only the single words that are included in the dictionary and still keeps any multiword. Therefore when applying the multiwords filter, we keep a more limited set of alpha strings.
For the dictionary filter we used a moderate sized English dictionary, which was designed for Scrabble style computer word games and we augmented the words in the dictionary with common names and top words from television and movie scripts. We also show the results for no alpha string filtering. Table 8 shows that using less aggressive filters such as multiwords or dictionary words does reduce the password loss due to filtering. However, these approaches are not as successful as the more aggressive approach (all-alphas filter) in subsequently identifying the passwords because they still retain too many alpha strings. Because of the large number of alpha strings that appear in the final token list and because of the way the probability of each token is calculated (having equal probability values for all the words of the same length), we end up having a large number of alpha strings with fairly high probabilities so that when we select the top N potential passwords using our algorithms, we do not find as many of the passwords as quickly as we could when eliminating all of the alpha strings.
The sentences filter was designed to reduce documents containing text but as noted previously the tool we used was not able to distinguish between sentences and non-sentences. As shown in Table 8 , this filter was not that useful as compared to the other filters. Better tools for identifying sentences could make this approach more useful. In Table 8 we see that all of the filters are better than no filtering and the all-alphas filter is much more effective than the others even though it might filter out some of the passwords before the identification process. Furthermore, as before the 1-by-1 algorithm seems to be the best overall.
In order to see how fast we identify passwords, we explored in more detail the 1-by-1 algorithm using the various specialized alpha string filters (in addition to the initial filters). In Figure 1 we plot N versus the recall value for all integer values of N until we find all of the passwords that can be found by that filter (the results are averages of several runs). Remember that some of the filters cannot achieve a recall value of 1.0 since some of the passwords might have been filtered out before the identification process. For example, the aggressive all-alphas filter may not be able to find all of the passwords, but on average finds 9 of the passwords (recall of 0.6 and precision of 0.005) at N = 1,659. In comparison, when applying no specialized filter we find 9 of the passwords only at N = 229,671. Figure 2 . As seen in Figure 2 , the all-alphas filter identifies about half of the stored passwords even within the first 500 proposed tokens. Sometimes even finding one password on the disk could be very helpful for an investigator since users typically use the same password for many sites / accounts. For the all-alphas filter in Figure 2 the first password was found on average at N = 11.
It may be interesting to see an example of the type of potential passwords returned by the 1-by-1 algorithm. In Table 9 we show the top ranked 20 potential passwords and their associated probabilities when using the all-alphas filter in one of our tests. Two of the 15 passwords stored on this disk are among these top 20 potential passwords returned by our system. These are lyndsay1 and blueberry1. It is not clear how one might improve the filtering and ranking since all of the other potential passwords in fact seem to be possible passwords as well. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described a new problem, identification of passwords on media. We described our proposed solution that first captures strings from the disk and then uses a set of filters that substantially reduces this set. We then use a PCFG to assign probabilities to the remaining tokens and develop algorithms for ranking potential passwords from the token set. Our results show that by using the 1-by-1 algorithm and our filters, we can identify most of the passwords by proposing a relatively small set of tokens from the disk. For example, using a large disk containing around 49 million tokens, we were able to propose an ordered potential password set of length 2000 which identified 9 of the 15 stored passwords.
Furthermore, we can very quickly find at least a few of the passwords. In the same example, we were able to find on average one password within the top 11 tokens and 3 of the passwords within the top 50 tokens.
We believe the importance of this work is that: (1) it can successfully identify the more likely passwords on disks with large numbers of tokens; and (2) it can return a small set of potential passwords to be tried based on the investigator's resources. We analyzed the problem for hard disks. We think that the problem of identifying passwords on cell phones and USB drives is similar to the disk problem and we intend to explore this in future work. We also intend to explore other approaches for identifying and filtering sentences. The filters can also be adapted for more targeted attacks when other information is known to the investigator such as the password policy, names of family members or date of birth. These values could be given more weights in the ranking algorithms.
